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Summary: On October 14, 2004, the Payment Cards Center hosted a workshop led by 
Professor Mark Budnitz of Georgia State University School of Law. Budnitz, the 
author of four books and many Law Review articles on consumer payments, described 
how the current regime of consumer payment regulation and various new payment 
products have led to much confusion among consumers. He also discussed a remedy 
for this situation: the adoption of uniform federal consumer protection standards. This 
paper summarizes the workshop and is organized around two of Budnitz’s key 
assertions: (1) the current regulatory environment is confusing for consumers and (2) 




On October 14, 2004, the Payment Cards Center hosted a workshop led by Professor 
Mark Budnitz of Georgia State University School of Law. Budnitz, the author of four books and 
many Law Review articles on consumer payments, described how the current regime of consumer 
payment regulation and various new payment products have led to much confusion among 
consumers. He also discussed a remedy for this situation: the adoption of uniform federal 
consumer protection standards. Budnitz’s comments were based on preliminary research for an 
upcoming article on the need for more uniformity in the regulation of consumer payment 
systems.
1 This paper summarizes the workshop and is organized around two of Budnitz’s key 
assertions. 
Budnitz began the workshop by offering an explanation of his perspective on consumer 
payment issues. As a law professor and consumer-focused attorney, he is primarily informed by 
situations in which consumers are not well served by the payment system. “I only see the train 
wrecks,” he explained, “not how the trains run most of the time.” Budnitz learns of these “train 
wrecks” through e-mails and phone calls from distressed consumers or their attorneys and his 
work with various organizations that represent consumer interests, such as the National Consumer 
Law Center and the Atlanta Legal Aid Society. Because of this particular perspective, Budnitz 
acknowledged that he approaches regulatory issues differently than might an economist or a 
representative of the payments industry. “While I respect those that represent the interests of 
banks or look at problems in a different way,” he explained, “I advocate a regulatory framework 
that is consumer-focused.” 
 
“The Current Environment Is Confusing for Consumers” 
  Budnitz’s first key assertion was that the current consumer payments environment, with 
its complicated products and disparate laws, is confusing and overly complex. As evidence of 
                                                 
1 The Center’s web site will be updated to include a link to this article when it is made available. 
  1this, he pointed to four developments that, in his view, have made it more difficult for consumers 
to understand their rights: (1) the increased use of new electronic check technology and the 
passage of the Check Clearing for the 21
st Century Act; (2) the evolution of laws that govern 
consumer checking account transactions; (3) the names the industry uses to describe various 
payment products; and (4) the introduction of new card products and their inability to fit neatly 
into the existing regulatory framework. Each of these developments is described in more detail 
below. 
New Check Processing Technology & Check 21 
  Budnitz argued that the increasing popularity of new electronic check products and the 
passage of the Check Clearing for the 21
st Century Act (Check 21)
 2 make payment by check “a 
complicated and bewildering exercise for consumers.” 
Prior to the advent of new check processing technologies, all checks cleared and settled 
in their paper form and were governed by two sets of rules: a state-based set of rules found in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
3 and a federal set of rules embodied in Regulation CC (Reg 
CC).
4 In this traditional paper-based system, if an error, such as a posting error, occurs, the state 
UCC determines the extent of the check writer’s rights. 
  Today, in the wake of Check 21 and new check processing technologies, how checks 
clear and settle and the legal landscape of check transactions are much more complex. Checks 
may clear and settle in their paper form (as noted above) or may be processed using a variety of 
electronic technologies. One of these new non-paper processing methods leverages the 
Automated Clearing House and involves the recipient of the check “converting” it into an 
                                                 
2 The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21) is a federal law that went into effect on October 
28, 2004. It aims to reduce the time, risks, and costs associated with paper check processing by facilitating 
the movement of electronic check images. 
3 The UCC is a set of model state laws that have been adopted in substantially the same form by most 
states. These laws cover a wide variety of commercial transactions, including check and wire payments. 
4 Regulation CC, promulgated by the Board of Governors, implements the Expedited Funds Availability 
Act and sets forth guidelines for when banks must make deposited funds available to consumers. 
  2electronic funds transfer.
5 Check transactions that have been “converted” in this way are referred 
to as electronic check conversion (ECC) transactions.
6 Regulation E, which governs electronic 
funds transfers, and the rules of a private organization, the National Automated Clearing House 
Association (NACHA), govern ECC transactions. If an error, such as a posting error, were to 
occur in the processing of an ECC payment, a consumer would have the same federal rights she 
would have if she had used a debit card for the transaction. 
Another non-paper-based method of processing checks is a direct result of Check 21. As 
of October 28, 2004, in lieu of submitting checks in their paper form for clearing and settlement, 
banks are permitted to “truncate”
7 paper checks and electronically transmit images of them. This 
reduces the overall costs of clearing and settlement by eliminating transportation costs. If a bank 
chooses to truncate and the consumer who wrote the check elects to have it returned to him or 
her, three laws apply: the UCC, Reg. CC, and Check 21. If a posting error were to occur in this 
situation, the consumer would have a federal right to a series of error resolution procedures. 
Budnitz criticized a framework that can result in three different kinds of processing (i.e., 
traditional paper clearing, ECC, and electronic clearing) with different sets of rules. He said that 
most consumers believe that the same set of rules apply to all check-based transactions. “That 
might be logical,” he said, “but it is not correct.” Instead, check transactions are governed by 
three sets of rules contained in two federal laws, one non-uniform body of state law (the UCC),
8 
and the rules of a private body (NACHA). “This irrational patchwork creates an information 
asymmetry between banks and customers,” he argued, “leading consumers to make ill-informed 
decisions about which payment product to use for a given transaction.” 
                                                 
5 ACH transactions are electronic fund transfers that are processed over a secure network that connects U.S. 
financial institutions. 
6 Consumers must have notice that their check transactions are being converted into ECC transactions. 
7 Truncation involves stopping the movement of a check in its paper form through the clearing and 
settlement process and moving it into an electronic clearing and settlement system.  
8 Budnitz criticizes the Uniform Commercial Code as non-uniform because, although states adopt the 
model law in substantially the same form, variations in adoption render it non-uniform. 
  3Laws That Govern Checking Account Transactions 
  Budnitz further believes that the laws that govern consumer checking account 
transactions create “a tangled legal web” leading to consumer confusion. He explained that, from 
a consumer’s perspective, there are two basic kinds of checking account transactions: deposits 
and withdrawals. The law, however, creates a complicated framework into which subsets of these 
two transactions must fit. For example, as mentioned above, if a consumer accesses his or her 
account via check, the state UCC governs how problems are resolved. If a consumer uses a debit 
card or an ATM to access an account, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act regulates the consumer’s 
rights. If the consumer’s account is accessed with a substitute check, right under Check 21 apply. 
If the ACH system is used to access a consumer’s account (e.g., at the point-of-sale, by telephone, 
or over the Internet), NACHA rules can be of assistance. Further complicating this framework, 
Budnitz explained, is a separate body of law that addresses how banks deal with “non sufficient 
funds” (NSF) transfers. Overall, this framework confuses consumers and leads to situations in 
which they do not know which laws apply to any given checking account transaction. 
Names of Payment Products 
  Looking beyond the industry’s regulatory framework to its own marketing practices, 
Budnitz finds the names given to various payment products confusing. He contended that the vast 
majority of consumers understand how cash and checks look and function. The names of new 
electronic payment products that include words like “cash” and “check,” however, are misleading 
and confusing. For example, Budnitz explained that a “check card” neither looks nor functions 
exactly like a check. Similarly, a “cash card” neither looks nor functions like cash. A 
“convenience check,” he explained, looks like a check, but functions more like a credit card. A 
“money card” looks like a debit card but may function like a prepaid or stored-value card. “A 
product name that suggests that a product functions in a way that it does not,” he explained, 
“simply adds to consumer confusion.”  
  4New Card-Based Technologies and How They Fit into the Existing Framework 
  Another source of confusion, Budnitz believes, is the result of two developments: federal 
regulators trying to shoehorn new card products into a 20- to 30-year-old regulatory framework 
and state regulators trying to tailor new regulations for new card products. “In the good old days,” 
Budnitz explained, “Regulation Z covered credit cards, Regulation E covered debit cards, and no 
laws really covered prepaid cards.” Today, however, the line between prepaid and debit is 
blurring. The FDIC and the Federal Reserve have proposed rules that would effectively treat 
some prepaid cards more like debit cards. States, he explained, have also become more interested 
in prepaid card regulation, passing statutes that address dormancy fees, redemption periods, and 
expiration dates. “Today you have some rather complex regulation of a product that, up until 
recently,” Budnitz explained, “was hardly regulated at all.” Such regulation provides consumers 
with some non-uniform protections at the expense of making the overall regulatory scheme more 
complicated.
9
   Budnitz concluded his discussion of consumer confusion by criticizing the current 
regulatory structure as inadequate, overly complicated, and misleading. “By targeting regulation 
at the sector or product level,” he asserted, “we have created a system that is non-uniform and 
treats seemingly similar transactions very differently. Such a system does not promote 
transparency or consumer understanding of rights.” 
 
“We Need Uniform Consumer Protection Standards” 
  Budnitz’s recent research has focused on finding ways to make the current regulatory 
scheme more consistent and easier to understand. Although he is still working on an article that 
will explain his proposals for legal reform in detail, he argued that there should be some level of 
                                                 
9 For a thorough discussion of the regulatory issues facing prepaid card products, see the following paper 
that summarizes a conference the Center hosted in June 2004: Mark Furletti, “Prepaid Cards: How Do They 
Function? How Are They Regulated?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Payment Cards Center 
Discussion Paper (August 2004), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/pcc/papers/Prepaid_Cards.pdf. 
  5federally mandated protection available on all payment products. As a starting point, he argued 
that the following three protections be adopted: (1) mandatory disclosures; (2) caps on consumer 
liability for unauthorized use; and (3) error resolution procedures. These protections, Budnitz 
argued, should derive from federal legislation, be uniform in their application, and cover all types 
of consumer payment vehicles. 
  In Budnitz’s view credit cards and debit cards already have sufficient federal disclosure 
requirements as mandated by Regulations Z and E, respectively. He proposed creating new 
disclosure requirements, however, for various check products and prepaid cards. For checks, 
consumers should be informed about how post-dated checks are processed and the requirements 
for using checks to discharge claims that creditors might have against consumers. Check writers 
should also be made aware of how their rights might be affected if their checks are truncated. For 
prepaid card customers, Budnitz called for the disclosure of a variety of card attributes, including 
any expiration date, potential fees, and redemption rights. Prepaid cards should also come with a 
toll-free number that consumers can use to obtain balance information, inquire about billing 
errors, and request reimbursement for card losses. 
  Budnitz also advocated limiting consumer liability for the unauthorized use of any 
payment vehicle. At present, users of credit cards, debit cards, and checks are already protected 
from liability for unauthorized charges. Budnitz would like to extend similar protection to prepaid 
cards. He suggested, for example, that a prepaid cardholder’s liability for unauthorized charges 
should be limited to $50 as long as a cardholder notifies her issuer of a loss in time for the issuer 
to block the card’s further use (and where such a block is feasible). This liability limit is 
analogous to the limit established by Regulation E for debit cardholders who promptly notify 
their issuers about unauthorized use. 
  Finally, Budnitz asserted that all payment products should have some form of error 
resolution protection. Currently, prepaid cards and most checks do not have any federally 
required error resolution mechanisms. Citing Regulation E’s error resolution procedures as a 
  6model, Budnitz would like consumers to have 60 days to notify their bank about a possible error 
and banks to have a maximum of 45 days to investigate it. He also advocated that such 
investigations extend beyond errors made within consumers’ banks to those made by merchants 
and other financial institutions that might have been involved in processing the payment. 
  Uniformity of consumer protections across payment vehicles, Budnitz asserted, would 
benefit all payment market participants. For consumers, such protections would reduce confusion 
and increase the likelihood that they would try new payment products. For the industry, uniform 
federal standards would make it easier to comply with federal law and improve consumers’ 
overall confidence in the payments system. Finally, for regulators, uniform standards would 
simplify the process of crafting and enforcing regulations. Overall, Budnitz noted, such reforms 
would add integrity to the system and make it more rational.  
  While Budnitz would like to see a uniform system of protection based in federal law, he 
believes that states should play a role in shaping the protections. “State consumer protection laws 
that do not conflict with federal standards and that give consumers additional protection,” he 
asserted, “should not be preempted.” Budnitz recognized that states play an important role as 
“laboratories” for policy “experiments.” While products are still in their infancy, however, he 
thought states should be discouraged from imposing overly burdensome regulation. His approach 
would balance the need for uniformity with the need to let states experiment with new and 
creative policy solutions. 
  Budnitz emphasized that, while the goal of his proposed reforms is uniformity, there 
would likely have to be exceptions, exemptions, and variations for certain products. “There are a 
number of factors, including operational issues,” he said, “that require some variation of these 
protections by product.” He also indicated that there would likely need to be some “de minimus” 
exceptions to the policies (e.g., for prepaid cards with very little value loaded onto them). A 
“transitional” period for newly introduced payment technologies would also be necessary. During 




  Budnitz believes that, from a consumer’s perspective, the payments landscape is overly 
complex. Regulation varies too much at the product level. In addition, a consumer’s rights are 
determined by the processing choices of others instead of by laws based on decisions about what 
rights should be accorded as a matter of public policy. According to Budnitz, this creates a system 
that is confusing and leads to ill-informed decisions on the part of consumers. To remedy this 
problem, Budnitz is calling for the reformation of the system of federal laws that pertain to 
consumer payments. In his view, all products should have similar disclosure, error, and fraud 
protections. The federal government should set a protection “floor” for all products and allow 
states to provide additional protections. With such reforms in place, Budnitz believes that 
consumer confidence in the payment system will increase and the industry will find it easier to 
introduce innovative products. 
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